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jurisdictional scope of the Clayton Act. Such an action should not be
attributed to Congress without a very clear demonstration of congres-
sional intent. Yet, the Supreme Court in American Building reached its
conclusion on the basis of arguments that, while valid, fall short of
clearly establishing such a congressional intent.
The direct practical implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
American Building are not crucial since most section 7 actions do
involve corporations actually participating in interstate commerce; only
a relatively small number of important cases will fall outside the reach of
the Clayton Act as a result of the decision. More importantly, however,
the American Building decision, coupled with the Gulf Oil v. Copp
Paving Co. decision, suggest a hostility on the part of the Burger Court
toward vigorous enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. This hostility
may be reflected in the Court's handling of other antitrust issues.
RicHAR_ A. SIMPSON
Civil Rights-A Back Pay Award Standard: Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,2 represents the Congres-
sional effort to eradicate discrimination in pfiblic and private employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' Since
July 2, 19651 the federal judiciary has possessed discretion under Title
VII to award back pay to employees and applicants for employment
who prove that they were the victims of unlawful employment prac-
tices.' In exercising this discretion the lower federal courts have devel-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1)-(2) (1970).
4. This is the effective date of id. § 2000e (1970).
5. Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
This section provides that:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate (emphasis added).
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oped inconsistent and even conflicting standards6 to determine whether
or not to award back pay. On. June 25, 1975, almost ten years after the
effective date of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court addressed
this question for the first time in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody.7 The
majority opinion," after rejecting the standard applied by the Fourth
Circuit, designed a stringent requirement that a district couxt must meet
to justify a denial of back pay to a plaintiff who has successfully proven
he was the victim of an unlawful employment practice.9
The plaintiff class in Moody was comprised of present and former
black employees of Albemarle Paper Company's Roanoke Rapids,
North Carolina paper mill. One of their major allegations 0 was that the
plant's present job seniority system was perpetuating the overt segrega-
tion that existed in the plant's departmental assignments prior to July 2,
1965.11 They sought injunctive and back pay relief."2 The district court
found that the job seniority system constituted an unlawful employment
practice and ordered the company to implement a system of plantwide
6. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
7. 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
8. Id. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist
and Blackmun filed concurring opinions. Mr. Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
.9. Id. at 2370, 2373.
10. The plaintiffs also alleged that the company's pre-employment testing program
was being used as a pretext for discrimination. They argued that the company's
requirement that applicants for employment in the skilled job classifications possess a
high school diploma and pass both a verbal and nonverbal intelligence test was not a
valid job-related requirement in accordance with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). The district court refused to enjoin this testing program. The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court holding that Albemarle had failed to justify their testing
procedures under the "business necessity" test outlined in Griggs. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the issue to the district court for
consideration in accordance with the Court's opinion. For the Supreme Court's coverage
of this issue see 95 S. CL at 2375-81. For a general coverage of pre-employment testing
and the consequences of the Griggs decision see Comment, Employment Testing: The
Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1972).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 2367-68. The district court found that the company had utilized
racially discriminatory employment practices that placed blacks in only certain depart-
ments in the plant prior to July 2, 1965. It also found that though these practices had
been abolished the "job seniority" system that had been instituted under a new collective
bargaining agreement with the Halifax Local No. 425, in 1968, was perpetuating this
prior overt segregation. This was due to the fact that the former black lines of progres-
sion were tacked on to the bottom of the former white lines thus placing the black
employees in the lowest paying job categories. Therefore, when layoffs were necessary,
the blacks, being in the lowest job categories, were the first to be laid off. White em-
ployees who occupied positions in the higher job categories were thus isolated from such
actions. The district court ordered the company to institute a system of plantwide sen-
iority where such actions as layoffs and promotions would be determined by the number
of years one had with the company, not by one's job classification. Id.
12. Id. at 2367.
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seniority. The court refused, however, to award plaintiffs back pay for
losses attributable to the job seniority system because there was no
evidence of bad faith non-compliance with the Act.1 3 Additionally, the
court concluded that Albermarle would be "substantially prejudiced" by
such an award since the claim for back pay was not made until five
years after the suit was filed. 4 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the denial of back pay, holding that: "[A] plaintiff or a
complaining class who is successful in obtaining an injunction under
Title VII of the Act should ordinarily be awarded back pay unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust."'" The Su-
preme Court, although agreeing with the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the
district court, rejected the "special circumstances" standard. 10 Instead,
the majority fashioned a standard based upon their interpretation of the
congressional objectives behind the enactment of Title VII.' 7 In articu-
13. Id. at 2368. The district court based this conclusion on its findings that Al-
bemarle had as early as 1964 begun an active recruitment of blacks for its Mainte-
nance Apprenticeship Program and that certain lines of progression in the plant had been
merged on its own initiative. Id. at 2387 n.1.
14. Id. at 2368. In an answer to Albemarle's motion for summary judgment filed on
November 22, 1966, the plaintiffs stated that they were seeking only injunctive relief.
Then, on June 4, 1970, almost five years after the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs
informed Albemarle that they planned to amend their complaint and include a prayer for
back pay relief. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 145 (4th Cir. 1973).
15. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973). The court
indicated that the situation in which an employer has instituted a certain employment
practice relying upon a state's women's protective statute would be a "special circum-
stance." Id. at 142 n.5. See notes 29-31, 57-59 and accompanying text infra for a further
discussion of states' women's protective statutes and Title VII.
16. 95 S. Ct. at 2370. The Fourth Circuit's standard was based upon Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), which dealt with the
proper standard to be applied by a district court in determining whether to award
attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff in Title II (public accomodations) litigation.
Though the Supreme Court stated that this would be an appropriate case for determining
Whether to award attorney's fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff as well, it rejected its
use as a precedent concerning back pay awards since it was not directly on point. 95 S.
Ct. at 2370.
17. As discussed in Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Cot4. L.
Rnv. 431 (1966), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a compromise measure
of the Eighty-eighth Congress. Much of the controversy centered around the question
who was to possess the power to enforce the provisions of the Act and provide remedies
for discriminatees. Though there was basic reliance upon the National Labor Relations
Act, there was one important deviation from that model that reflects the compromise
nature of the Act. Where the NLRA provided for an administrative agency (NLRB)
possessing both investigatory and judicial functions, the EEOC under Title VII was given
only investigatory and conciliatory functions. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-61 (1970) with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). This difference reflected
the opinion of most congressmen that the final determination of employment discrimina-
tion should rest with the federal judiciary, and that the litigation burden should fall upon
those private litigants alleging such discrimination. Vaas, supra at 436. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972), authorized the Attorney General to bring
suit on behalf of discriminatees in "pattern and practice" situations. The Equal Employ-
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lating these objectives they stressed the use of the National Labor
Relations Act as a model in the drafting of Title VII,'1 particularly as to
the remedies section, which is almost a verbatim copy of the same
provision in the NLRA.' 9 Also noted was the fact that under NLRB
case law, back pay has been liberally awarded 0 as a means of fulfilling
the dual objectives of "reimbursing employees for actual losses suffered
as a result of a discriminatory discharge and of furthering the public
interest in deterring such discharges."'" The majority in Moody conclud-
ed that the congressional objectives behind Title VII's enactment were
analogous to those of the NLRA.22 Therefore, a denial of back pay to a
plaintiff involved in Title VII litigation, who had successfully proven the
existence of unlawful discrimination, could only be deemed proper if
such a denial would not frustrate the Act's general objectives of elimi-
nating discrimination in employment and providing the victims of such
discrimination compensation for economic losses they had suffered.28
Prior to Moody, the development of conflicting judicial standards
governing the award of back pay under Title VII resulted from incon-
sistent judicial responses to the major defenses that have been asserted
by employers to justify a denial of back pay. 4 Probably the most
frequently asserted defense has been based upon the language of section
2000e-5(g), which authorizes an award of back pay "[i]f the court
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1970), gave the EEOC the power to initiate litigation on behalf of individuals
but the final determination of discrimination and the awarding of appropriate relief
remains with the federal courts. For a detailed discussion of the EEOA of 1972 see Sape
& Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
Gno. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972); Note, In America, What You Do Is What You Are:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 22 CATHOLIC U.L. RV. 455 (1973).
18. 110 CONG. REc. 7214 (1964). See also Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BRooxYN L. REV. 62, 64-65 (1964); Vans,
supra note 17, at 433.
19. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
20. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Mastro
Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
21. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1965). Accord,
Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 118
CONG. Ruc. 7168 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
22. The Court also relied upon its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-31 (1971), in identifying the primary objective of Title VII: to eliminate
employment discrimination throughout the economy. 95 S. Ct. at 2371.
23. 95 S. Ct. at 2373.
24. The issue of back pay is of course only reached after the existence of unlawful
employment practices has been established by the plaintiff. For .more extensive
coverage of defenses which have been asserted by employers see Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fmu.
472, 511-34 (1974).
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engaging in an unlawful employment practice .... ,25 The argument
has been that "intentional" means the plaintiff must prove that the
employer's motive in using a particular employment practice was to
discriminate. Though this construction has received some acceptance,20
most courts have instead interpreted "intentional" to mean that the
challenged employment practice was undertaken deliberately rather than
by accident.2 7 This position stresses that relief under this section is
designed to compensate victims for the consequences of unlawful prac-
tices rather than to punish employers for the motivation underlying such
practices.28
A unique version of the "non-intentional" defense has been assert-
ed in a number of sex discrimination cases. This defense involves an
employer allegation that the employment practice complained of was
instituted in good faith reliance upon a state statute ostensibly designed
to protect women,29 and has been accepted by some courts as a complete
defense to a back pay award."0 Other courts have viewed such good
faith reliance as an "intentional" violation within the meaning of the
statute, but have nevertheless affirmed denials of back pay as properly
within the trial courts' discretion."'
Employers have also argued that their present good faith efforts to
comply with Title VIE should give the court justification for denying
back pay. This defense typically involves plaintiffs who, like those in
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1970).
26. E.g., United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F.
Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
27. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002
(9th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to rule 60, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
28. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);
Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
29. These statutes typically limit the number of hours a woman can work per day,
or the number of pounds she may be required to lift regularly on the job. See, e.g., Ang.
STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1960); CAL. LIoR CoDE §§ 1350, 1350.5 (West 1971).
30. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971);
Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
31. E.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946
(1972); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
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Moody, are victims of employment practices that are not discriminatory,
but that nevertheless perpetuate the effects of prior overt discrimina-
tion.32 Although occasionally accepted at the district court level,"3 this
defense has been rejected by all three of the circuit courts of appeal in
which it has arisen on the grounds that back pay, by its statutory nature,
is compensatory rather than punitive. 34 The only "good faith" defense
consistently accepted by the courts is the narrow one contained in
section 2000e-12(b) of the Act, which provides that an employment
practice instituted in reliance upon a written interpretation or opinion of
the EEOC will not constitute an unlawful practice.3 5
Employers have on occasion asserted that the plaintiff was not
entitled to back pay, even though unlawful discrimination had been
proven, because the plaintiff's claim for such relief had not been filed in
a timely manner. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits36 have both rejected this
defense relying upon rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 7 and the broad compensatory purpose behind Title VII. However,
it has been indicated that this defense would be effective if the employer
could prove actual prejudice as a result of the belated clain.35
32. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1972).
33. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd,
495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974). This defense was also accepted by the district judge in
Moody. 95 S. Ct. at 2368.
34. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Head
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper
Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit's response in Johnson, supra at
1376, is representative:
Goodyear's argument completely misconstrues the nature of a back pay
award. The entire thrust of this contention is based on the premise that back
pay is punishment for its misdeeds and thus the court in good conscience
should consider the motive of the employer in imposing the "penalty." This
proposition has been totally rejected by our court . . . Our Circuit has been
steadfast in its determination to insure that sufficient affirmative relief be pro-
vided to vindicate the rights guaranteed by Title VII. In short, back pay
awards are not designed to punish the employer but to economically elevate
the victims to the status which is rightfully theirs (footnotes omitted).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970). Cases in which this particular defense has
been raised have turned on the issue of whether the interpretation allegedly relied upon
was actually "a written interpretation or opinion of the EEOC." E.g., Sprogis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
36. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Ro-
sen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1969).
37. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c) requires that "every final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings."
38. E.g., Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); Robinson
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Additional defenses"9 that have received inconsistent treatment by
the lower federal courts have been based upon the uncertain state of the
law surrounding back pay,40 the difficulty in determining the eligibility
of discriminatees for back pay,41 and the difficulty in ascertaining the
amount of back pay to award.42 The inconsistent standards employed by
the lower federal courts to govern back pay awards, demonstrated by the
unpredictable judicial responses to employer defenses, were expressly
noted by the Supreme Court in granting certiorari in Moody.4"
Viewed in the context of prior judicial ambiguity, the primary
significance of the Moody opinion is its definitive resolution of this
judicial uncertainty in favor of a consistently liberal approach toward
the award of back pay. Evident throughout the opinion is the proposi-
tion that a denial of back pay should be the exception rather than the
rule, once a finding of discrimination and economic loss by the discrimi-
natee has been made. This orientation is clearly revealed by the Court's
statement that "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination."" The affirmation of a liberal approach is
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
39. Two other defenses which are not relevant to the development of judicial
standards governing an award of back pay in the Moody context have been adequately
treated elsewhere. For defenses based on class action requirements see Edwards, The
Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. RaV. 781
(1974). See also 95 S. Ct. at 2370 n.8. For defenses based upon the appropriateness of
back pay claims by the government on behalf of discriminatees in "pattern and practice"
suits see Annot., 21 A.L.R. FaD. 472, 504-08 (1974).
40. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1974) (defense rejected); United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir.
1973) (defense accepted); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.),
dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (defense rejected).
41. E.g., Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 497 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 826 (1975) (defense accepted); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (defense rejected); United States v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973)
(defense accepted).
42. E.g., Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975) (defense
rejected); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974)
(defense rejected); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973)
(defense accepted); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed
pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (defense rejected).
43. 95 S. Ct. at 2369. Compare Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973) with Kober v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2373.
also exemplified by the Court's rejection of the district court's "no bad
faith" reason for denial of back pay.45 The Court reasoned that "Title
VII is not concerned with the employer's good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent for Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."4 6
The only exception to the Court's firm rejection of the "good faith"
defense is the narrow one expressly provided for in section 2000e-
12(b).47
The carefully articulated standards concerning back pay awards in
Moody are firmly based upon a perceptive review of the legislative
history48 and prior judicial interpretations of the Act.49 Having earlier
identified the primary purpose of Title VII to be the achievement of
equality of employment opportunities,50 the Court rejected as inconsist-
ent with that purpose Albemarle's contention that a district court has
virtually unfettered discretion to award or deny back pay,51 and that the
statute provides no further guidance 2 Instead, they reasoned that any
discretion that exists to deny back pay after a finding of unlawful
discrimination must be derived from an examination of the possible
roles that such an award would have in achieving the congressional
objectives of Title VII. 3 Relying upon language from the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. N. L. Industries,54 the majority concluded that back
pay awards could further the primary objective of guaranteeing equality
of employment opportunity by providing employers with a catalyst to
reexamine and reevaluate their own employment practices and could
thereby lead to the eradication of discrimination through self compli-
ance.55 The secondary objective of the Act, to compensate or "make
45. Id. at 2374.
46. Id. This reasoning is the same as that expressed by the various circuit courts of
appeals in their rejection of the "good faith compliance" defense discussed in the text
accompanying notes 32-35 supra, and the majority view of the definition of "intentional"
in section 2000e-5(g) discussed in text accompanying notes 25-2-8 supra.
47. The Court stressed the narrowness of this defense saying, "it is not up to the
courts to upset this legislative choice to recognize only a narrowly defined 'good faith'
defense." Id. at 2374 n.17. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
48. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 24-43 supra.
50. The Court also relied upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971), in identifying this primary objective. 95 S. Ct. at 2371.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 2370.
52. Id. at 2370-71. See note 16 supra.
53. 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72.
54. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72. For the contrary conclusion drawn by Mr. Chief Justice
Burger in his dissent, see id. at 2387-88, in which he reasons as follows: "By the same
token, if employers are to be assessed backpay even where they have attempted in good
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whole" the victims of unlawful discrimination, is obviously supported by
an award of back pay.58 This analysis of the interrelationship between
the statutory objectives and back pay results in an almost total repudia-
tion of trial court discretion, once unlawful discrimination has been
established.
The Moody decision leaves some uncertainty concerning two de-
fenses to back pay awards. One still unsettled defense involves an
employer trapped between the dictates of Title VII and a state's wom-
en's protective statute.57 The Court declined to rule on the validity of
those decisions that have affirmed denials of back pay under such
circumstances. 58 However, cases of this type should be of decreasing
significance in the future, since a number of these statutes have been
invalidated by lower courts.59 In jurisdictions in which this has not yet
occurred, employers who recognize this judicial trend should rely upon
similar local statutes only if actively enforced by state officials. Even
under such circumstances, an employer could be reasonably prompted
by the Moody decision to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity
of the state statute to foreclose any possibility of subsequent liability for
back pay.
The other unsettled defense involves the question whether the
lateness of the request for back pay in Moody was a sufficient reason
for denying back pay. Though the majority indicated that a denial on
this ground could prevail despite the Moody standard, it remanded the
issue to the district court for a determination whether Albemarle had
been in fact prejudiced and whether the plaintiffs' conduct was excusa-
faith to conform to the law, they will have little incentive to eliminate marginal practices
until bound by a court judgment."
56. See text accompanying notes 28, 34, 46 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
58. 95 S. Ct. at 2374 n.18.
59. E.g., Bums v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972). These cases have relied upon the supremacy clause of tho
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970), which reads as follows.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or fu-
ture law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be
an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
The effect of such invalidations upon back pay claims is exemplified in Schaeffer v.
San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the court denied
back pay for the period in which the employer had in good faith relied upon a California
women's protective statute; but authorized such an award to the plaintiff for a period
after the statute had been declared invalid and the employer had nonetheless continued
to rely upon it. For the EEOC's position on this subject see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)
(1974).
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ble.60 If the district court does find that Albemarle was unexcusably
prejudiced by plaintiffs' late claim and denies back pay, then it must
carefully articulate the grounds upon which its conclusion is based.""
The majority emphasized that review by the Fourth Circuit of such a
finding would be governed by the familiar "clearly erroneous" and
"abuse of discretion" tests. 62 Mr. Justice Marshall devoted his entire
concurring opinion to this issue, concluding that Albemarle had not
been substantially prejudiced and that the plaintiffs' actions were ex-
cusable.63 However, Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his dissent stated that
the district court had not abused its discretion on this issue.64 The prac-
tical impact is that the Court's handling of this issue in both substance
and tone seems to undercut the liberal approach taken by the majority
towards back pay awards in general. Although this aspect of the deci-
sion could be fatal to the efforts of the Moody plaintiffs to secure back
pay and could likewise exert an adverse effect on an unknown number
of pending Title VII cases, it offers but limited solace to employers who
continue to resist the broad egalitarian mandate of the Act. In view of
expansive Supreme Court decisions under the Act during the last few
years, it may reasonably be anticipated that most recently filed com-
plaints automatically include a claim for back pay; certainly this will be
true in the post-Moody era. Consequently, even if Justice Marshall's
well-reasoned analysis of the laches defense is not accepted by the dis-
trict court on remand, the Moody opinion will effectively achieve its
primary objective of using the threat of a back pay award to coerce
voluntary employer compliance with the requirements of Title VII.
The standard applied by the majority in Moody is a stringent one.
The defenses that remain available to employers faced with back pay
claims are extremely limited. This will hopefully have the effect of
increasing the number of employment discrimination disputes that are
settled without litigation and quicken the pace of employers in taking
affirmative action to comply with Title VII. It is only through such self-
compliance that the primary objective of Title VII, "to eliminate, as far
as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history," 65 can be met.
F. JosEP: TREAcY, JR.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2375.
61. Id. at 2373 n.14.
62. Id. at 2375.
63. Id. at 2383-84.
64. Id. at 2388.
65. United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
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